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Investigating the Special: The Symbolic
Function of the Independent Counsel
JUDITH ROOF"

In June, 1999, the Independent Counsel Statute-the authorizing amor and
arsenal of our most recentprosecutorial Starr-lapsed. Still the subject of debate over
its constitutionality, import, and effectiveness, this last installment of the 1978 Ethics
in Government Act sponsors a legacy of questions, double-guesses, accusations, and
recriminations symptomatic of the underlying breach the statute was designed to
reveil.2 This breach, opened wide by President Nixon and the "Saturday Night

Professor of English, Michigan State University, and an attorney-at-law. She is the
author of four books, including ReproductionsofReproduction:Imaging Symbolic Change.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
2. There have been two waves of commentary on 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599, the first in the
seventies and eighties around its original passage in 1978, and the second in the late nineties
when the statute was scheduled to lapse in the wake of Kenneth Starr's investigations of
President Clinton. Early questions involved the Act's constitutionality, particularly the problem
of separation of powers, which was considered by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988). See, e.g., Howard H. Baker, Jr., The ProposedJudiciallyAppointed
Independent Office ofPublicAttorney: Some ConstitutionalObjectionsandan Alternative,29
Sw. L.J. 671 (1975); Harold H. Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24
WI.LAMETTEL. REV. 539 (1988); Steven L. Carter, TheIndependent CounselMess, 102 HARV.
L. RnV. 105 (1988); Carolyn M. Corry, On the Constitutionalityofthe Independent Counsel
Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act: Do They Comport with the Separation of
Powers?,26 DUQ. L.REv. 715 (1988); Simon Lazarus &Jane E.Larson, The Constitutionality
ofthe Independent CounselStatute, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 187 (1987); Carl Levin & Elise J.
Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter ofPublic Confidence and Constitutional
Balance, 16 HoFsTRAL.REv. 11 (1987); Constance O'Keefe& Peter Safirstein,FallenAngels,
Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examinationof the Practical,
Constitutional,and PoliticalTensions in the Special ProsecutorProvisions ofthe Ethics in
GovernmentAct, 49BROOK. L. REV. 113 (1982); Donald J. Simon,A ConstitutionalRationale
for the Independent CounselLaw, 25 AM. CRM. L. REV. 229 (1987); Alexander I.Tachmes,
Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978: A Violation of the
Separation ofPowers Doctrineor an EssentialCheck on Executive Power?, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 735 (1988); Charles Tiefer, The ConstitutionalityofIndependent Officers as Checks on
Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV.59 (1983); The ConstitutionalValidity ofthe
Ethicsin GovernmentAct: Morrison v. Olson, 16 HOFS'RAL. REV. 65 (1987); A Symposium
on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing the Constitutionalityof the Independent CounselStatute,
38 AM. U. L. REV. 255 (1989).
Second wave commentary was more worried both about the statute's failure to depoliticize
the prosecutorial process and about its fundamental fairness. Scholars either suggested possible
reforms or argued for or against the statute's lapse. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, OnImpeaching
Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291 (1999); John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law
Improvementsfor the Next Five Years, 51 ADMiN. L. REV. 631 (1999); Susan Low Bloch, A
Report Cardon the Impeachment:Judgingthe InstitutionsthatJudged PresidentClinton, 63
*

LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS. 143 (2000); Marjorie Cohn, The Politicsofthe ClintonImpeachment

and the Death of the Independent Counsel Statute: Toward Depoliticization,102 W. VA. L.
REv. 59 (1999); Julian A. Cook III, The Independent Counsel Statute: A PrematureDemise,
1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1367; Julian A. Cook III, Mend It or End It? Whfat to Do with the

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 77:277

Massacre," evokes a figurative failure (and the failure of a figurehead), a gaping,
embarrassing place the law did not quite seem to cover.' Designed to redress any

Independent CounselStatute, 22 HARv. JL. & PUB. POL'Y 279 (1998); Joseph E. diGenova,
The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to End a Bad Idea, 86 GEO. L.J. 2299, 2303
(1998); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the
Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349 (1999); Robert W.
Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship:Starr's OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1999); Ken Gromley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A
Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REv. 309 (1999); Symposium, The Independent Counsel
Statute: Reform orRepeal?, 62 LAw& CoNTEmp. PRoBS. 1(1999); Brett M. Kavanaugh, The
Presidentand the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2135 (1998); William K. Kelley,
The ConstitutionalDilemma ofLitigation Under the Independent CounselSystem, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 1197, 1207-11 (1999); Stephan 0. Kline, Heal It, Don't Bury It! Testimony on
Reauthorizationoftthe Independent CounselAct, 1999 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 51; John
F. Mannin, The Independent CounselStatute: Reading "Good Cause" in Light ofArticle II,
83 MINN. L. REv. 1285 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, Beyond the Independent Counsel.
Evaluating the Options, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1047 (1999); Norman J. Ornstein, Doing

Congress'sDirty Work, 86 GEo.L.J. 2179 (1998); Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel
Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 475-79 (1996); Comm. on Fed.
Legislation, The Politics ofProsecution:The Independent CounselStatute, 53 REC. ASS'N B.
CITY N.Y. 574r (1998); Thomas 0. Sargentich, Debating the Future of the Independent
CounselStatute, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 657 (1999); Christopher H. Schroeder, The Independent
CounselStatute: PuttingLaw andPolitics in the Right Places-Reformingthe Independent
CounselStatute, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163 (1999); Russell M. Soloway, Critiqueof
Morrison: The Tale ofthe OmnipotentProsecutor:How Recent Events Expose Flawsin the
Supreme Court'sAnalysisofthe independentCounsel Clauseofthe Ethicsin GovernmentAct,
17 R v. LITIG. 611, 611 (1998); David A. Strauss, The Independent Counsel Statute: What
Went Wrong?, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 651 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad
Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2282 (1998) [hereinafter Sunstein, Bad Incentives]; Cass R.
Sunstein, Lessonsfrom a Debacle: FromImpeachment to Reform, 51 FLA. L. REv. 599 (1999);
Lawrence E. Walsh, The Needfor Renewal ofthe Independent CounselAct, 86 GEO. L.J. 2379
(1998); Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence,98 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1998).
This extensive listing is to illustrate not only the volume of commentary on this two-decade
statute, but the oppositional character of the commentary.
3. Of the rationales offered for the passage of the Ethics in Government Act in the first
place, the conflict of interest problems around Nixon's prosecution figure as the primary
historical catalyst. As Orrin Hatch comments,"the primary impetus for our nation's first
independent counsel statute was the firing ofthen-Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
in 1973 by President Nixon." Orrin G. Hatch, The Independent CounselStatute and Questions
About Its Future, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 145 (1999). More pragmatic
considerations, however, are offered for why the procedures take the shape they do. For
Congress's explanation see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1756, at 78-79 (1978), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4381, 4394-95. Katy Harriger suggests that:
Congress faced a serious dilemma: If it wanted to solve the problems of conflict
of interest and appearance of independence, it had to remove or at least limit
executive control; the amount of debate and resistance to the notion on
constitutional grounds, however, made it very difficult to remove that control
completely. There were also secondary concerns about fairness to the targets of
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further high-level peccadilloes, the 1978 Act'appointed a "special prosecutor" who
would properly choreograph future official dressings down. In 1983, the terminology
in the Act for this avenging agent changed from "special prosecutor" to "independent
counsel"; this change anticipated a shift from the shady, sideshow investigation of
judges and minor officials in the eighties and early nineties to a Klieg-lit presidential
center stage, signaling the centrality of the symbolic anxiety (and anxiety about the
Symbolic) the statute itself embodies.4 While one might easily demonstrate that the
Ethics in Government Act is about both patching and revealing a failure of Law, it
is also about the powerful erotics of Symbolic transformation-the process of veiling
and unveiling necessary to install a new Symbolic in the place of the one that has
been gradually eroding.
The key word here is "erotics." The role of the Independent Prosecutor is to
arrange the various investigations, inquiries, press releases, indictments, and
hearings-the "veils" that reveal and obscure the questions, facts, and innuendoes of
alleged misconduct. This unusually empowered independent force manipulates
inquiry and information in such a way as to provoke desire and allay public anxiety
by substituting desire for anxiety, curiosity for knowledge, innuendo for event, and
science for truth. The various terms suggestively cover one another, simultaneously,
signaling the presence of something behind, while enacting its absence, drawing
attention to one site by withholding its view, distracting thus from another in plain
sight in a drama of perpetual provocation, deflection, and displacement. In the case
of Independent Counsel Starr's choreography of various Clinton debacles from
Whitewater to Lewinsky, the veils produce an oscillating drama of
conjecture/evidence, errant Father/sinning son, metaphor/metonymy in a shell game
of sliding significations that is ultimately less about ethics or crime than it is about
securing a new order, the order of the son who moors a very different Symbolic
system. The prosecutorial veil dance enacts the terms of a transition from a Symbolic
based on substitution to one operating on enchainment, while seeming to revitalize
conservative patriarchal values. This transition is subtle, made acceptable by its
covert eroticization of the terms (it is no accident that Starr's investigation centered
on illicit sexual behavior) and naturalized by changes in technology and the effects
of globalism. It is important, however, for among other things, the ways it resituates
Law, which goes from a system centered on the idealized Word to a series of
situational prohibitions and requirements that represent no single unified Truth, but
rather evince a variety of finely-tuned opportunistic managements.

investigations and about an "out of control" prosecutor, that worked against
creating a truly independent investigator.
Katy J. Harriger, Can the Independent Counsel Statute Be Saved?, 62 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoBS. 131, 133 (1999)..
4. The change in the nomenclature of the prosecutor was made in the 1983 amendments
to the Act. See Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 2, 96
Stat. 2039,2039 (1983). As Priester, Rozelle, and Horowitz point out, "Congress believed that
the label 'independent counsel' had less negative connotation: 'This change would remove the
Watergate connotation of a special prosecutor investigation and would help spare the subject
of such investigation adverse public reaction."' Benjamin Priester et al., The Independent
Counsel Statute: A Legal History,62 LAW& CoNTEMP. PROBs. 5, 10 n.12 (1999).
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Though what I described in the previous paragraph may have more to do with
Kenneth Starr's own performance ofhis role as independent counsel, the combination
of the rationale for the Ethics in Government Act, its symptomatic changes in
nomenclature, its failure to depoliticize investigative processes, the unhampered
powers it afforded the independent counsel, and the very public nature of its wideranging aegis set the stage for precisely the kind of symbolic process I am suggesting
Starr enacted. I am also suggesting that this process was neither random nor merely
an effect of increased media access. Rather, the combination of the statute and Starr
produced an instance of a much larger trend in which the very character of law and
systemic logic are in the process of changing. Starr's performance is thus less
idiosyncratic than symptomatic and the Ethics in Government Act very much an
indicator of anxiety about law, government, politics, and the legal system in general.
I. THE LAW'S

"SPEcIAL' SYMPTOM

If we understand federal legislation as a textual body whose slips and
inconsistencies reflect in some Freudian way the preoccupations and anxieties of an
American cultural unconscious, then the Ethics in Government Act provides a special
example of an attempt to use legislation to compensate for a perceived legal lack. It
is generally agreed that the statute was enacted in response to Nixon's attempts to
circumvent Department of Justice investigations into his activities.5 According to
Katy Harriger, the Act's purpose was to reassure the public that government scandals
could be investigated impartially," or as Herbert Miller and John Elwood suggest,
"Congress created a statute designed to ensure investigations would be conducted by
someone outside the executive branch." 7 Julie O'Sullivan argues that its purpose was
"[t]o promote the appearance and reality of evenhanded justice."8 On a conscious
level Congress rearranges the relations among criminal law and prosecution; in so
doing, it also rearranges slightly the balance of powers taking some prerogative from
the executive and transferring it to the judiciary, all to stymie leaderly disdain for
moral imperatives.'

5. Like Hatch, see supra note 3, Priester, Rozelle, and Horowitz attribute Nixon's
misdeeds as the prime motivation for the passage of the Ethics in Government Act:
The tragedy of Watergate inspired the creation of a permanent statutory scheme
for appointing an officer, independent from the supervision and control of the
President, to investigate and prosecute crimes by high-level federal officials.
President Nixon's misconduct, of course, prompted calls for greater scrutiny of
high-level government officials generally. In addition, a particular episode during
the Watergate period-the "Saturday Night Massacre"--reinforced the principle
that criminal investigations of the President or persons close to him must be
handled by an officer with political independence.
Priester et al., supra note 4, at 9.
6. See Harriger, supranote 3, at 136.
7. Herbert J. Miller, Jr. & John P. Elwood, The Independent Counsel Statute: An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed,62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112 (1999).

8. See O'Sullivan, supra note 2, at 463.
9. This problem of the separation ofpowers was one ofthe prime considerations of those
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The statute, however, also works as an unconscious symptom, signaled by the 1978
statute's use of the term "special" to denominate the prosecutorial position of extraexecutive, impartial, and evenhanded investigation. A symptom is a metaphor for an
untranslated unconscious message; it is a compact manifestation of an unconscious
problem that appears as an odd and repeating figuration in representations. ° While
the concept of the symptom emerges from psychoanalysis-the Freudian slip that
reveals unconscious thoughts, for example, or the insistent and unmotivated
appearance of an object or idea that suggests unconscious preoccupation-it can also
be used figuratively as a way to discern the less-than-overt preoccupations of a
culture, especially as symptoms appear in synchronic formations through a number
of apparently disparate representations." The form and content of the symptom relate
to and often reveal the nature of the problem a symptom makes visible. Hence, the
famous sexual preoccupation subtending the popularized Freudian slip is directly
linked to the sexual content of the slips themselves." At the same time, the relation
between sexual preoccupation and the slip reveals the structural relation between
modem Western culture and a sexuality that is repressed thus emerges as if by
accident.
The structure of the symptom, then, reveals both some of the contents of an
unconscious (sex) and the character of the system within which such a symptom
might be significant (prohibition). Symptoms are the threads that unravel, like sofa
buttons (pointsde capiton), to quote psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan; theyhave a direct
line to the logic of the system itself-to its Law, its Symbolic, the very conditions of
its operation, its central premise. 3 When I evoke the Symbolic (with a capital "S"),

who worried about the statute's unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Corry, supranote 2; O'Keefe &
Safirstein, supra note 2; Tachmes, supranote 2.
10. The concept of the symptom as employed by psychoanalysts derives from the
conceptual tools of psychotherapy. As analyst Colette Soler explains, "the unconscious is a
split or schism in the subject's symbolic world: there are things the subject can synthesize
about himself and his own history, and others that he cannot." Colette Soler, The Symbolic
Order (H), in READING SEMINARS I AND II: LAcAN'S RETURN TO FREUD 47, 51 (Richard
Feldstein et al. eds., 1996). The symptom would be the part, represented by a signifier (a slip,
a word, a tic) that represents the unsynthesized part. Jacques Lacan defines the symptom as a
formation of the unconscious which is itself "a play of the signifier." JACQUES LACAN, FOUR
FUNDAmENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 130 (Alan Sheridan trans., Jacques-Alain

Miller ed. 1978) (1973).
11. Cultural critics deploy what is really an analogy to the psychoanalytic symptom,
treating culture as if it were a single psyche and treating inconsistencies, obsessive repetitions,
and other apparently odd formations as symptoms of a cultural unconscious. See generallythe
works of Slavoj Zizek.
12. For Freud's extended reading of such phenomena, see THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF
EVERYDAY LIFE (James Strachey ed. &trans., Hogarth Press 1960) (1901).
13. Ragland-Sullivan writes:
By deliberately creating irruptions and breaks in an analysand's unified story;
by listening for specific clusters around sounds, words, or concepts; by
following displacements, similarities, and substitutions.. . Lacanian analysts
are able to "guess" at associative elements of unconscious meaning. Lacan has
referred to such unconscious signifying effects in language as crossroad words
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I am referring to the register identified by Lacan as the network of rules, principles,
laws, and relations that govern human interactions." These include both official laws
and such other structural regulators as language, kinship, morality, and so on. All
manifestations of the Symbolic, like language, operate on a metaphorical principle in
which they substitute the Word for physical prohibition, social coercion, or
connection and develop systems of rules in relation to a larger principle. It is because
of the connection between symptoms and the Symbolic that symptoms emerge in the
first place, for they reveal not small exceptions, but rather a larger problem, not
idiosyncratic difficulties, but a rift in the system itself.
The central metaphor of the Symbolic is the Law-of-the-Name-of-the-Father
whereby Western culture attempts to produce a definitive connection by appending
a name where there otherwise might not be one. This produces a Symbolic that
appears to have meaning at a center-the Word or Name-which itself underwrites
allmeaning. Hence, Western culture is dominated by such formations as monotheism,
constitutional government, common law-any site where the Word is imagined as
originary, generative, and precedential. The Symbolic, however, is changeable and
has been changing, perhaps most spectacularly in the metonymic logics of
technology, various notions of relativism and relativity, and evocations of
multiculturalism. The battle is not between conservatives and liberals as different
takes on the same everlasting Truth, but rather between metaphor and metonymy as
coexisting logics within a larger transition from the dominance of one to the other.'5
The term "special" is itself a symptom. In relation to a body of law presumed to
work more or less uniformly and universally, the word "special" denotes in itself the
exception, the extralegal gathered in and treated as its own "special" case. As a legal
term, "special" denotes among other things an event or circumstance beyond the

or "knots" of meaning.
ELLIE RAGLAND-SULLIVAN, JACQUES LACAN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 109

(1986). Ragland-Sullivan also notes suggestively that "[a]fter Lacan, reality, rationality, and
objectivity appear as comforting illusions-pointsde capiton-amidthe truths of plurality,
ambiguity, and uncertainty." Id. at xvii.
14. One ofthe three orders knotted together, according to Lacan, the Symbolic (in relation

to the Imaginary and the Real) is a"predetermined linguistic network, which forms identity and
mind." Id. at 162. As Colette Soler points out, in his later career, Lacan reduced the Symbolic
to "the logic of signifers, the logic of discourse." Soler, supra note 10, at 52. What is
particularly important in this context is the concept of the Law-of-the-Name-of-the-Father as
a defining instance of a particular Symbolic order governed by a logic of metaphorical (or
substitutive) relations that characterize both language and law. See JUDITH ROOF,
REPRODUCTIONS OF REPRODUCTION: IMAGING SYMBOLIC CHANGE 19 (1996).

15. The connection between the Symbolic, Law, and language is premised on the logic of
discourse. This logic, at least in Roman Jakobson's analysis, is defined according to two
principles: metaphor (Freud's condensation) where a word stands in more or less arbitrarily for
something else and metonymy (Freud's displacement) where sense derives from the chaining
of elements ortheir contiguity. These two logics coexist, dominated at least until the nineteenth
century by metaphor as manifested in the ways cosmologies defined science. Arguably after the
spread of geared machines and the discovery of the molecular, the Symbolic has been shifting
gradually to metonymy. See ROMAN JAKOBSON & MORRIS HALLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF
LANGUAGE 76-82 (1956).
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normal, something "supplemental" to the regular, or "assigned or provided to meet
' "Special" is a term that appears
a need not covered under established procedures." 16
sporadicallyin federal legislation, always as a Band-Aid orthe provision of oversight
where otherwise something seems to slip through. The federal statute covering civil
service employees has a provision for a "special counsel' whose job it is to
investigate prohibited personnel practices. 7 There is a United States Court of Federal
Claims Office of Special Masters that oversees claims made under such statutes as
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program." Other federal statutory
provisions provide for a Special Trustee for American Indians under the American
Indian Trust Fund Management Reform."9 There is aspecial counsel to oversee unfair
immigration-related employmentpractices, 0 Presidential Special Representatives for
Arms Control,21 and a "special selection board" to consider the promotion of officers
not considered because of administrative error.?
In referring to something beyond the normal, the word "special" points to the gap
it fills, something otherwise uncovered, beyond normal treatment, or even above the
law. While the sporadic use of special counsel and masters in federal statutes all seem
to address unusual or supplementary situations in the course of normal governmental
operation, the term "special prosecutor" in the Ethics in Government Act focuses on
the status of the personnel it targets, betraying a worry that someone might be above
the law. If someone is above the law, then the Law itself must not be comprehensive.
If the law cannot cover every case, then is it Law? If the Law is not indiscriminate,
then the very concept of Law as a holistic, evenhanded arbiter of truth and conduct
suffers. If Law is threatened with not being Law at all-with not being the Word that
in ameaningful and consistent fashion links the otherwise arbitrary relations between
words and deeds-then it may become merely a list, a fabricated collection of
individual rules without system or Truth, their concocted, negotiated, infinitely
idiosyncratic nature exposed. If Law is not articulated within an imaginary universal
system (for example, the Constitution, common law), then its masquerade is stripped,
the Wordbreaks down into words, and its underlying makeshift character-its chaotic
balancing of chaos-is revealed. This worry is doubled in relation to a figurehead
who is already supposed to work symbolically.
Passed after President Nixon's betrayal of public trust, the 1978 federal statute
created the "special prosecutor, ' whose job it would be to address, if necessary, a
wide range of misdeeds which by the 1994 installment included a fairly long list of
officials, beginning with the President and Vice President as well as:
(2) any individual serving in a position listed in section 5312 of title 5; (3)any
individual working in the Executive Office of the President who is compensated
16. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 461 (1996).
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214-1222 (2000).

18. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-12(c) (1994).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

25 U.S.C. §§ 40414046 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c) (2000).
22 U.S.C. § 2567 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
10 U.S.C. § 14502 (2000).
28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
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at a rate of pay at or above level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313
of title 5; (4) any Assistant Attorney General and any individual working in the
Department of Justice who is compensated at a rate of pay at or above level III of
the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5; (5) the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue; (6) the chairman and treasurer of the principal national
campaign committee seeking the election or reelection of the President, and any
officer of that committee exercising authority at the national level, during the
incumbency ofthe President; and (7) anyindividual who held an office or position
described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) for 1 year after leaving the office
or position.'
The statute also provides for an independent counsel for persons whose prosecution
might cause a conflict of interest ifpursued by officials of the Justice Department and
for members of Congress.' In other words, the statute applies to anyone who might
be a significant political appointee and who, by virtue of his or her office lacks the
checks of typical hierarchical or congressional oversight. Once the Attorney General
deems there are sufficient grounds for the appointment of such a functionary by the
division of the court, the independent counsel is empowered
to fully investigate and prosecute the subject matter with respect to which the
Attorney General has requested the appointment of the independent counsel, and
all matters related to that subject matter. Such jurisdiction shall also include the
authority to investigate and prosecute Federal crimes, other than those classified
as Class B or C misdemeanors or infractions, that may arise out of the
investigation or prosecution of the matter with respect to which the Attorney
General's request was made, including perjury, obstruction ofjustice, destruction
of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.26
Independent counsel investigate special crimes by special people under special
circumstances with very special jurisdiction over potentially self-perpetuating
infractions produced by the investigation itself. The big gap around the big people is
covered over with big power wielded by one very big person without the checks and
review power normally a part of other kinds of prosecution. Neither the Attorney
General's decision that an independent counsel be appointed nor most of the actions
of the independent counsel are reviewable, except that the independent counsel is
subjectto oversightby Congress 7 and must comply with the explicit provisions about
expenses in the statute itself.s
The nature of the gap in law signaled by the term "special" becomes more apparent

24. Id. § 591(b).
25. Id. § 591(c).
26. Id. § 593(b)(3).
27. Id. § 595(a).
28. See United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
Attorney General's decision to appoint an independent counsel under the Ethics in Government
Act is nonreviewable).
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in the 1983 change from "special prosecutor" to "independent counsel." If, as I have
argued, "special" signals a patch in the law, what does "independent" mean and-why
change from one term to the other? In legal discourse "independent" means "not
contingent or unaffiliated." 29 In the context of the Ethics in Government Act it
connotes an agent who acts freely and without restraint or influence from others. It
is someone who does not hold an office of profit or trust under the United States with
"appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution
in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner,"3' but who has "full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and
powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or
employee of the Department of Justice."'" Such a supergun is specifically
independent from the Department of Justice"z but is subject to congressional
oversight.3
What "independent counsel" really seems to mean in the 1994 version is someone
free of conflict of interest with the current administration. The function is aimed in
only one direction: toward high-ranking government officials who otherwise have no
regulation other than their own conscience. As Senator Hatch commented, the Act is:
astatutory "auxiliary precaution" designed to curb abuses ofpower by aPresident.
The statute attempts to accommodate two related interests: (1) avoiding the
inherent conflict of interest that arises when a prosecutor investigating the
President is controlled by the President, and (2) deterring the use of presidential
power to commit crimes.'
Dubbing such an agent "independent" assures us that this agent will do a conflict-free
job on office-holders who seem to be full of moral and legal conflict. But does it?
The Congress doth protest too much. As above, such nomenclature, especially the
need to change it, also suggests some underlying preoccupation with interest, with the
fact that no such agent will ever be independent at all, and hence the prosecution of
the law will always be as it always has been: ideological, biased, and in the otherthan-justicial interest of someone. The term "independent" is overcompensatory for
the very lack of independence that independent counsel betray in almost every other
way. For one thing, by statute independent counsel report to a political and politicized
body-the Congress or the Attorney General in some circumstances. For another, the
task is initiated and they are appointed by what turns out also to be politicized
bodies-the Attorney General and a panel of judges all of whom are political
appointees. What the term "independent" covers over, then, is such agents' very lack
of independence, their function as political and party games-masters as well as the
bias residing throughout the system, sanitized by this statutory protest of disinterest.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 241 (1996).
28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2).
Id. § 594(a).
Id. § 594(i).
Id. § 595(a).
Hatch, supranote 3, at 145.
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The symptomatic term "independent" in fact produces its breach all too visibly.35
But why be concerned about this lack of disinterest at this point in time? Because
the bias of the law has become all too visible, its fictive (imaginary) attachment to
justice all too tenuous and in need of constant care. Evidence: the vast body of
television law docudramas, cases ofjustice carried andmiscarried, including the Starr
Report itself.36 Law has become a public spectacle, a soap, a series, which, while
coping with personality as one analysis, looks to forensic science as another. If the
law is not working on the macrolevel, we look to the micro to see that the cardinal red
trilobal nylon fibers of the type found in 1978 Dodge Chargers and bordellos can
indeed, through the miracle of electronmicroscopy and the sagacity of nameless
faceless technicians still be connected to the corpse, if not the corpusdelicti. Law no
longer reigns on the level of the Ideal-morality, principle, Right and Wrong-but
only in gapless chains of evidence that link culprits physically, literally to the deed.
And while such evidence seems only necessary to corral wrongdoers so that
RightlWrong can give them their just deserts, Right/Wrong come to exist only in
relation to this forensic truth, circumstantial and eyewitness testimonybecoming less
and less convincing, the sentencing more mandatory, and decisions made earlier
(without the benefit of DNA) coming under scrutiny. Although one could argue that
the larger system is still in place-and I would agree-its modes of determination
have become obsessively more material and microscopic just as Starr attempted to
prove Clinton's moral unfitness by identifying seminal DNA. Both evidence chains
and defenses (based on DNA as well) have retreated to the molecular. The chain
takes over the Ideal; the breach or gap between Word and Deed that subtended a
metaphorized idealized legal system becomes deadly to one requiring complete
evidentiary metonymies to get from deed to Word in the first place.
The exposed and compensated breach in Law as a system represented by the
independent counsel is, however, not finally a hole in the Law, or at least not on the
surface. Even if the independent counsel statute is an attempt to correct what is

35. Many commentators demonstratethe very lack ofpartisanship and political intrigue that
has characterized Independent Counsel Starr's performance. From James Carville, whose AND
THE HORSE HE RODE IN ON: THE PEOPLE v. KENNETH STARR (1998) exposes Starr's many
potential interests, to such legal scholars as Kavanaugh, see supra note 2, The City of New
York Bar Association, and Schroeder, who suggests that "[t]he fundamental flaw in the
independent counsel law-not the only flaw, but the root of many of its problems-consists
of its attempt to convert a political decision, the decision whether to refer a case of public
corruption to an investigator outside normal prosecutorial offices, into a legal one." Schroeder,
supra note 2, at 163.

36. While television shows treating law enforcement have always been a broadcast staple,
the number and kind of these programs has proliferated. The advent of expanded cable

channels has contributed to this, but the recent focus on forensic evidence in such shows as
MedicalDetectives and CSI: Crime Scene Investigationhave taken Quincy to new heights of
obsessive molecular detail. The StarrReportwas an immensely popular commodity. Its release

over the Internet prompted a rush to download it. Over twenty million Americans used the
Internet to access a copy of the report. See Kris Gautier, ElectronicCommerce: Confronting
the Legal Challenge of Building E-Dentitiesin Cyberspace,20 Miss. C. L. REv. 117, 122
(1999).
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perceived as an opportunity for high-level skulduggery, the object of investigation is
perhaps what is most suspicious about it. In other words, why do we need this statute
at all? Although myriad legal commentators have argued about the statute's utility,
inutility, constitutionality or lack thereof, I would like to take a different tack and
suggest that the statute exists as an orthopedic corrective for the potential failures of
the Law's central symbolic figure: the Father and the ways the President stands in for
such a symbolic figuration." It accomplishes this corrective not in what facts an
Independent Prosecutor may ferret out that might restore patriarchal rectitude, but
rather in achieving a shift in our understanding of what the Symbolic may be and
what mechanisms might govern it. It accomplishes this in two connected ways: 1) it
embodies a clash between and shift of logical systems around its Symbolic paternal
center; and 2) its very procedures enact such a shift before the public eye. It
accomplishes both of these through a process of perpetual unveiling wherein the
independent counsel functions as an unwitting agent of the progressive denouement
ofpreciselythe terms and mechanisms of a contemporary shift in the Symbolic order.
II. A

STARR PERFORMANCE

The first of the mechanisms imbricated in Starr's performance is precisely this shift
from a system figured by the Name-of-the-Father to one based upon metonymy, or
constant shifting and displacement through a linked chain of signifiers governed by
contiguity (much as in a chain of evidence) figured best by DNA. The second
mechanism is a politic ofpower and desire surrounding the mystified and demystified
Phallus, a signifier which only functions as a powerful Symbol of desire when
veiled." The Phallus is the signifier of desire, not as a desired object in itself, but as
the thing no one can have. Unveiling the Phallus produces the penis in all of its
inadequacies, undoing Desire, and substituting in its place tawdry wants such as
commodities or the silly perpetual series of petty infidelities circulated through talk
shows.
Starr's performance brought to us by the independent counsel statute brought these
two mechanisms together in a symptomatic way, which worked something like this:
The Phallus is an overdetermined signifier of desire, but also a metonym of the Father
and patriarchy. The Phallus works best when veiled. The Father is an overdetermined
Symbol ofpatriarchy. Patriarchy is a metaphor of Law in relation to the Name-of-theFather. The President is a symbol of Law and patriarchy. The President, thus, should

37. A Symbolic order which veers toward the orderingprinciple ofmetaphor is emblemized
by what Lacan calls the "Law-of-the-Name-of-the-Father." This law is essentially the principle
of all Law as a discourse which produces relations and fills gaps with words. At the same time
it is the symbol of prohibition. Property, for example, is a connection between a person and a
piece of land made through language-a deed. This is based on the idea that before it was
possible to determine with exactitude the identity of any father, the patronym was a way of
securing a connection. With the advent of DNA testing, paternity has become discemable,
which arguably indicates a slow shift from a Symbolic based on metaphor to one that works
through metonymy---the metonymies of DNA and digital computers. See ROOF, supranote 14.
38. For Lacan, the Phallus was a signifier of desire-the thing one wants but can never
have-rather than any literal human organ. See RAGLAND-SULLIVAN, supranote 13, at286-87.
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figure as both Father and Phallus. Unveiling the Presidential Phallus, as Starr tried
to do in very literal terms, would seem to reveal the lack in power and the lack in
Law-at least the Democratic Party version of these things. But where Starr and his
backers were mistaken was in the idea that this was ever about an individual and his
evil system-defiling crimes. Unveiling reveals instead that the Symbolic we thought
was there isn't; rather, it is somewhere on the other side of the stage-in the laughing
son, the "slick" one who evades unveiling not because he's tricky and corrupt (that
was Nixon), but because his very figuration works through another logic to begin
with-a glissement or slide through a series of positions he can occupy with equal
ease. This metonymical son is frustratingly devious, not as a character flaw, but as an
essential attribute of a metonymic Symbolic. Like the sun-spot in the eye, we can
never actually see him; such is the nature of his mystery. In other words, if we could
not look on the Father through prohibition, we cannot see the son because he'll never
be where we look, which is not about the individual but about representation and
systemic transformation. Starr tried to look at the father's nakedness to prove his
unworthiness. What he found was that Clinton wasn't the father at all (he deposited
his sperm in unfatherlyplaces), but the scion of another system altogether. The drama
of Starr's investigation played this discovery (or unveiling) out in full public view.
The manager of this Phallic Unveiling is the Ethics in Government Act itself and
the independent counsel it puts in charge. Not only does its very presence signal a
symptom of some breach in the Symbolic-in Law-as it attempts to patch it up, it
also provides a familiar prosecutorial dynamic as the means by which the shift from
metaphor to metonymy in the Symbolic-this veil dance-is performed. The
independent counsel statute provides a controlled mechanism for revealing that
someone's Phallus is the penis; and thus that someone is unworthy of his figurehead
status. But as we have seen, it actually redistributes the Phallus both to those who
appear to wield the veil (that is, to Ken Starr, Republicans, Morality, and so on) and
to the laughing son who always appears to evade them, even when comered into
denials. The so-called evasiveness of Clinton's denial figures the evasiveness of the
filial Symbolic not as a system of prevarication and inauthenticity, but as a system of
virtuous (and virtual) sliding, figured already by the multiple displacements
discovered in the so-called presidential primal scene-the shift from penis to cigar,
from vagina to mouth, all parts equal and interchangeable. The statute operates in
such a way that it enables the constant displacement of what it reveals as it reveals it,
preserving power and performing the metonymic logic whose way it paves. And here
is how:
1.The process begins when Congress displaces part of its impeachment aegis to the
Ethics in Government statute which itself displaces legal oversight from one site to
another-from the Official to the hired gun-so that the site from which the Law has
been displaced can be policed. This already involves a catalyzing displacement from
the figurehead to the Attorney General, who determines if an investigation is
warranted. The statute is aimed at the executive branch, but through a chain of
associations, also at any person who occupies a position of discretion and power in
the government, including members of Congress and judges.
The statute addresses criminal acts. The notion of criminal, as we saw throughout
Starr's investigation, is already a displacement from moral rectitude. If an act is
immoral, then it must be criminal, which is of course, ultimately the gap Starr failed
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to fill.3 9
This displacement ofoversight is veiledby the supposed congressional motivations
for passing the Act. It is generally agreed that the statute was enacted in response to
Nixon's attempts to circumvent the Department of Justice's investigations into his
activities. The Act supposedly replaces partisanship with an evenhanded procedure.
Evenhandedness veils all especially in its impossibility.
2. Evenhandedness is, however, a myth that veils a covert interest in ideals of moral
rectitude while perpetuating a myth of legal fullness. In collapsing morality and law,
the statute also works as an unconscious symptom of a desire to fill an apparent lack
of morality with the ubiquity of law. The statute fills such lack as if the absence of
moral character were already an exception, and as if such a special functionary simply
reduplicates powers already present (for example, in the Department of Justice, in
Congress) through the provision of "special" means. "Special" signifies an anxiety
about the law's power (or powerlessness) in relation to morality, but it also might
appear to be a potent, pervasive, prohibitive, and effectual force.
3. Ifwe recover from the shock of recognizing our cultural symptom as both a lack
of morality and law's failure to compensate-or if the import of such recognition is
missed (which always happens with a public captivated by figural trees instead of the
diversified forest)-the veil of the "special" is pulled aside in favor of the truth of
"independence." If, as I have argued, "special" is a symptom that points to a patch in
the law, "independence" signifies a power that makes up for any lack in the law.
Under the Act, the independent counsel enjoys wide-ranging versatile powers; it is
someone "who does not hold an office of profit or trust under the United States" with
"appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution
in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner," but who has "full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and
powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or
employee of the Department of Justice.. 4 ° "Independent" is, thus, very alluring,
veiling either a Law so pure it insists on fairness or so corrupt that it must launder its
image.
It also enables an intrinsic unfairness and imbalance in a system ofjustice thought
to be evenhanded. Critics of the statute have observed that it gives the independent
counsel too much unreviewable discretion in its investigative aegis that can result in
abuse, harassment, and the pursuit of information that is finally not relevant to any
criminal misbehavior. In addition, the independent counsel's relative freedom from
oversight makes leaks to the press difficult to monitor or stop."

39. Nixon's endeavors were fully criminal, but Starr's investigations ofthe Clintons, while
ostensibly about criminal activity, really focused on immoral sexual behavior. The pretense of
perjury only thinly veiled an investigation designed to reveal questionable moral character.
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 593(b)(2), 594(a) (1994).
41. Robert W. Gordon comments that:
[t]he statute gave the counsel's office no other job than to investigate and
prosecute a designated target. The counsel was unconstrained by budget, other
tasks compelling asense ofpriorities or proportion, competing political concerns,
or any time-table to complete his work. He had access to the full terrifying
machinery ofthe criminal process: to subpoena individuals to testify before grand
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4. We imagine Independence reflects the Law's power, but it also works either
prophylactically or cosmetically. Each veil when removed, as we have seen, reveals
not the Law but yet another veil that seems to protect it. At the same time, each veil

is an imitation of the law, not unlike Parrhasios's painting of the veil, which fooled
its viewers into believing it was a veil covering another painting.42 As a veil-as

something that covers over what might be nothing-the law also suggests that the
Law itself is a veil, a conceptual system that covers over the very lack at its core, a
lack whose exposure is threatened in this case by executive arrogance. The veil
obscures the Law so that, like the Phallus, it retains its mystique and power. However,
if the Law is revealed as not indiscriminate and consistent, then the very concept of
Law as a holistic, evenhanded arbiter of truth and conduct suffers. If Law is exposed
as uncentered and unprincipled, then it scatters-becoming merely a list, a fabricated
collection of individual rules without system or Truth-their concocted, negotiated,

infinitely idiosyncratic nature exposed.
5. Again the presto chango: the Law as veiled produces the Veil as Law and we are
back to "Independent" as the veil that obscures the Phallus, but might really hide the
penis. The Ethics in Government Act is not about an idealized evenhandedness, but
about a specific kind of political interest. What "independent counsel," thus, really
seems to mean is someone free of conflict of interest with the current administration.
Such nomenclature, especially the need to change it, suggests some veiled
preoccupation with interest itself, with the fact that no such agent will ever be
independent at all. Hence the prosecution of the law will always be as it always has
been: ideological, biased, and in the other-than-justicial interest of someone. The term
"independent" is overcompensatory for the very lack of independence such figures
betray in almost every other way. In addition to statutory dependencies, independent
counsel have all sorts of conflicts in the private, ideological, and political realms as

juries; to threaten indictments or grant or withhold immunity; to prosecute
witnesses for perjury or false statements if not told what he wanted to hear; and
to call upon FBI agents and private investigators without limit and turn them into
great armored tanks to run the state's investigative authority through the lives of
targets, witnesses and their families and friends, shattering their privacy and their
reputations and bankrupting them with lawyers' fees. The appointing judges of
Special Division might select as counsel a political enemy of the Administration
he was supposed to investigate. If he ran amok the Attorney General would risk
a "firestorm" of public criticism if she tried to remove him for cause. Yet so
concerned was the statute to make him independent that he could operate without
any real supervision or check on his abuse of office.
Gordon, supra note 2, at 639-40; see also DiGenova, supranote 2, at 2302; O'Sullivan, supra
note 2, at 475-79; Sunstein, Bad Incentives, supra note 2, at 2282. There are several scholars
who also comment on the independent counsel's relations to the press. See, e.g., Ronald D.
Rotunda, Independent Counseland the Charges ofLealdng:A BriefCaseStudy, 68 FORDHAM
L. REv. 869, 869-75 (1999).
42. In a competition between Zeuxis and Parrhasios over who could produce the most
lifelike painting, Zeuxis produced grapes that fooled birds, but Parrhasios painted a veil that
fooled Zeuxis, who asked him to draw it aside so he could see Parrhasios's painting. See
JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 103 (Jacques-

Alain Miller ed. & Alan Sheridan trans. 1978).
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Starr's case amply demonstrated.43 What the term "independent" veils, then, is such
agents' very lack of independence, their function as political and party games-masters
as well as the bias residing throughout the system, sanitized by this statutory protest
of disinterest.
6. Which is why the next veil is crucial. If we whip away "independent" we find
science, evidence impeccably chained. If the Law is a veil and "Independent" a veil
and they cover one another, what is behind the veil is ultimately Truth figured as a
metonymic chain of physically linked, material, molecular evidence: fibers, DNA,
DNA on fibers. The great fetish quality of the evidentiary chain is apparent in the
way law has become a public spectacle, which while coping with personality and
motive as its object looks to forensic science as the site of its Truth. Law is the veil
and alibi for this Truth, and molecular Truth is the veil for the Law-circumstantial
and eyewitness testimony has become less and less convincing, tape recordings
specious at best (also thanks to Nixon and Linda Tripp). The chain takes over the
Ideal; the breach or gap between "word" and "deed" that subtended a metaphorized
idealized legal systembecomes deadlyina Symbolic system, which requires complete
evidentiary metonymies to get from "deed" to "word'in the first place. The chain of
evidence embodies the shift in the system, but it too is a veil that obscures the
transition that occurs-in fact, it veils by presenting in fairly concrete terms the logic
that now governs.
7. The veil dance so far has been an aesthetic play of Symptoms, Law, and Truth,
which we might suspect cover over a very real absence somewhere. Finally the
independent counsel's veil dance neither hides nor reveals a hole in the Law, or at
least not on the surface, but instead reveals a shift in a system that will always cover
a gap because it is a system premised on gaps in the first place. The veil dance exists
as an orthopedic corrective for the potential failures of the Law's central, rapidly
obsolescing symbolic figure: the Father. When the paternal figure becomes too
literal-as DNA evidence now makes it-what happens to the system that depends
upon that figuration? It doesn't fall apart; rather, it scrambles to fill in, to substitute,
to replace that demoted Symbolic with another stronger one-science on the one
hand, or more laws on the other. Other possibilities include a megalomaniac
independent counsel who is on a "mission from God" or a gradual and subtle reliance
on chained matter, on DNA and digital systems.
Nixon failed. The all-too-fallible father is replaced by a statute that appoints a
better, "watch-doggier" father in its place. We still have presidents, but they are now
sons, gilded with residual symbolic resonance. Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton,
and Bush are no longer fatherly presidents (well perhaps Reagan, but more
grandfatherly, more in his dotage as an honorary old pensioner and openly corporate
boy, afflicted by Alzheimer's, influenced by astrologers and the machinations of his
wife-a paternity which also needs to have its viability very quickly confirmed by
history as we rush to name airports and monuments after him so we can continue to

43. The statute's ostensible depoliticization ofthe investigative process veils the alignment
of parties with sides in the investigation. Instead of inspiring confidence in disinterest, the
thinness of this veil provides yet another reason for the public to distrust the motives of
politicians.
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believe that a "B" actor could play the part that hadbeen unfilled for so long). Reagan
in fact reveals the whole failure of the President as Father: it is an act, both president
andfather. The sustaining metaphor of metaphor-of the power of the name to exert
connections where none exist-has lapsed into particularity in a field that has become
particulate. Semen on a Gap dress is its apt icon.
Thus, even more than the "special prosecutor," the independent counsel is the
conservator of Daddiness, of the Law's wisdom and wizardry displaced into an
evocation of"independence." Independence is theViagric supplement that revitalizes
Law, that inflates metaphor a little longer to sustain the arbitrarylinkbetween "word"
and "act." This supplement is no longer special but unique, alone, the first cause prop
that reminds us of what the Law is so we can continue in its eery and weary
afterglow, veiling as we unveil, playing the old game with new rules. But for this to
happen, the independent counsel, too, must, as Fedwa Malti-Douglas declares, be
unveiled to displace again into some principle of discrimination and balance the
manic excess of his voyeuristic paternal zeal." It was Starr, not Clinton, who finally
exposed the lack at one center that relocates the center somewhere else or perhaps
nowhere else and yet everywhere else.
By hyperbolizing the father's misdeeds, Starr tried to render again unto the father
the Father's power, reconstructing Clinton as the prime mover of the Evil Symbolic
of these global godless times. The drama of Clinton and the Starr Report is a perverse
drama of frustrated Symbolic repatriation, wherein ifwe can't have the good and pure
father (a la Eisenhower), then the bad father will suffice. (And this, one might
speculate is why Gore didn't win the election. He campaigned as a father,
reliteralizing and thus deflating what had just been displaced with great and clever
labor. Bush was smart enough to campaign as the son, the only symbolic position that
survives in what are arguably these post-Oedipal times.)
In its ever-shifting panorama of veils, the Ethics in Government Act performs the
shift to foundational metonymy the "Name-of-the-Father" does not allow before it
disappears itself. In appearing to bolster the Father, the Ethics in Government Act
provides the best veil of all: the Father as veiling his own demise, of Truth, Right, and
Justice giving way to DNA, carpet fibers, and tire tracks. The Law is not the Name,
but the chain, the logical interconnectedness of matter in a quantum universe, the
emergence of many sons who can tap one another, a la WWF, to produce continuity
in the name of contiguity, eternity in the name ofdigitality, and relevance in the name
of relativity.
The Ethics in Government Act lapsed in 1999, all chance of renewal quashed by
the obscene overzealousness of that prosecutorial son of Noah, who delighted in
ogling the father's nakedness, and who wished to transform a surreal primal scene
into a cultural trauma of epic proportion. In other words, byhyperbolizing the father's
misdeeds, this Jeremiah rendered again unto the father the Father's power. So
whether the statute was unconstitutional, unfair, or unwieldy, it had unwittingly
accomplished its symbolic task just in time to pass prerogative onto the savior son
who governs in the name of the father.
This analysis is, of course, very much a cultural psychoanalytical reading of the

44. See FEDWA MALTI-DOUGLAS,

THE STARR REPORT DISROBED

179-80 (2000).
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signifiers that played through the field occupied by the Ethics in Government Act. I
have focused on the ways the paternal function and its current (and probably centurylong crisis) has been part of the symptomatic baggage of the various contradictions,
illogics, and other detritus of the cultural excesses played out so dramatically by the
independent counsel in his lengthy investigation of the president. But this would not
be the first time I have come to this conclusion.45 Why do I keep coming back to the
sight of the father as the nexus of failure in the symbolic system itself? My pat
answer is that the symptoms keep leading there-remember the symptom always has
a metaphorical relation to the malaise it represents. But a more thoughtful answer is
that there are only so many. protracted figurations used to characterize human
relations. Though I could easily have embarked on a castrating unveiling of the
unveiled Phallus as another symbol playing through this mix, a more central
figuration has been the language of the nuclear family, which though it may function
as an analogy of hierarchy, gender relations, the structural laws of kinship, and the
devolution of wealth, also emerges as a symptom of the very terms at issue: law and
order.
It would be fair to say that "family values" is a code word for this very malaise.
The Starr Report and the general directions of Independent Counsel Starr's
investigations were inthe realm of the familial. Conflict ofinterestis figurative incest
or vice versa. Infidelity and adultery on an individual scale translate, in Starr's
universe, into a danger to the family politic. In other words, the structures through
which Stair's investigation makes any sense are already familial structural terms and
that is symptomatic in itself. And of course, finally, this isn't about any real father at
all, rather it is about the lack at the center of things which must be bridged some way
for anything to work at all. If the father no longer functions to cover this gap
symbolically, then something else takes its place. This is what the Independent
Counsel Statute repeats symptomatically---the covering of a gap that can never be
covered. Reading legislation as part of a network of signifiers in a cultural text
becomes scientific insofar as it is sometimes quite able to predict the general direction
of representational dynamics as those define rather than simply reflect deeper
structures. And I predict that we have entered the era of the son, a millennial passage
to a logic of constant displacement as systems take over themselves and we become
the digital peons in a decentered network operating under a logic of perpetual
displacement and eccentricity. In this logic the good old symbolic fathers-the
Reagans, Cosbys, Starts, and even Schwarzeneggers-appear as precisely the stopgap patriarchalB and-Aids they have become and the law becomes an ever-increasing
set of regulations less linked to, and consonant with, an ideal or principle and more
connected to a scattered pragmatism reflecting various disparate interests.

45. See generally ROOF, supra note 14.

